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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
TO THE PLAINTIFF HEREIN AND TO HER COUNSEL OF
RECORD:
COMES NOW Defendant, Internet Brands, Inc. (“Internet Brands”), and
hereby moves this Court for an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s single claim for
Negligence against Defendant pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
12(b)(6), on the grounds that the only cause of action fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. A conference pursuant to Local Rule 7-3 took place on
June 29, 2012.
Internet Brands’ Motion is based upon this Notice of Motion, the supporting
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Patrick A. Fraioli, Esq.
the pleadings, records and files in this action, and upon such oral and documentary
evidence as may be presented at the hearing of this Motion.



































DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.
INTRODUCTION
Headquartered in El Segundo, California, Internet Brands is a media company
that operates various websites and also develops and licenses internet software and
social and professional media applications. Within its Consumer Internet Division,
Internet Brands owns and operates more than 200 principal websites in seven
different categories. One of the websites owned and operated by Internet Brands is
modelmayhem.com (the “Website”), which is a social and professional networking
site for models, make-up artists, stylists, and photographers.
Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 14 (“Plaintiff”) alleges she was assaulted by someone
she met through the Website, which for purposes of this motion only, the Court may
assume to be true.1 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges she was “lured to come to South
Florida” where she was drugged and assaulted by unrelated third parties. See
Complaint, paragraph 11(a-e). Plaintiff then alleges that the Website owner should
be liable for the acts of these third parties because, (1) “Jane Doe was never warned
nor given any information about this scheme by Internet Brands, despite the fact that
she was a MODELMAYHEM.COM member, which made her particularly
vulnerable to the scheme” and (2) Internet Brands had the requisite knowledge to
avoid future victimizations of MODELMAYHEM.COM users by warning user of
online predators generally, and of the scheme employed by Flanders and Callum in
particular.” Id., at paragraphs 10 and 28, respectively. Plaintiff further alleges the
Website owner had a duty to warn, a duty to disclose, and a “duty of protection from
reasonably foreseeable harm.” Id., at paragraphs 33 and 34. Finally, plaintiff
alleges that her injuries were caused, “as a direct and proximate result of the
1 Internet Brands specifically denies the alleged assailant contacted Plaintiff
through the Website.






























DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
fraudulent solicitation, drugging, and rape…” Id., at paragraph 14. Put simply,




Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b), provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the
responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following
defenses by motion:
* * *
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
* * *
A Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is similar to the common law
general demurrer, i.e., it tests the legal sufficiency of the claims stated in the
Complaint. “The issue is not whether a plaintiff's success on the merits is likely but
rather whether the claimant is entitled to proceed beyond the threshold in attempting
to establish [her] claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974) 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct.
1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90. In considering a Motion to Dismiss brought under Rule
12(b)(6), the court’s duty is to, “determine whether or not it appears…under existing
law that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that might be proved in
support of plaintiffs' claims.” De La Cruz v. Tormey (1978) 582 F.2d 45, 48. “A
complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for one of two reasons: (1) lack of a
cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim.”
Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1984).
In the present matter, it is clear that plaintiff’s only claim, a claim of
negligence for failure to warn, is fatally defective. Applicable law does not create a
duty of care, a duty to warn, and provides absolute immunity in the circumstances






























DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
alleged in this Complaint. As “no relief can be granted under any set of facts that
might be proved in support of plaintiff’s claim” as pleaded, it must be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
III.
ISSUE TO BE DECIDED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT
The issues presented by this Motion are whether Plaintiff’s only cause of
action, negligence, should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6).
IV.
PLAINTIFF’S ONLY CAUSE OF ACTION, NEGLIGENCE, FAILS TO
STATE A CLAIM UPONWHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED
Well-settled authority establishes Internet Brands does not have a duty to
warn its users of the harm alleged and is absolutely immune from liability for the
harm alleged in this case. Julie Doe II v. MySpace, Inc., 175 Cal.App. 4th 561, is
directly on-point. The court in Julie Doe II carefully and thoroughly reviewed
voluminous state and federal decisions regarding similar claims, and concluded that
web-based service providers are not liable for common law torts committed by one
user against another user.
The question posed by this appeal is: Can an internet Web server such
as MySpace Incorporated, be held liable when a minor is sexually
assaulted by an adult she met on its Web site? The answer hinges on
our interpretation of section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.
We hold section 230 immunizes MySpace from liability. (citations
omitted).
The Julie Doe II court’s interpretation of the Communications Decency Act, 47
U.S.C. §230(c) (the “CDA”), relied upon extensive and unanimous authority
upholding the immunity granted by the CDA to web-based service providers for all
civil claims brought by a web user for harm caused by another user, as set forth
more fully below. The Julie Doe II court’s interpretation of section 230 of the CDA
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began with a review of the explicit language of the statute, which provides, in
relevant part:
Protection for ‘good samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
‘No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of –
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described
in paragraph (1).
The Julie Doe II court specifically found that section 230 of the CDA applied to all
common law torts. “The express language of the statute indicates Congress did not
intend to limit its grant of immunity to defamation. Instead, the legislative history
demonstrates Congress intended to extend immunity to all civil claims.” Julie Doe
II, at 568.
The court therein then reviewed uniform authority from other jurisdictions,
including Jane Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Jane Doe v.
MySpace”); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); and
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Zeran”). Each of those
cases is directly on point; the first two of which involve the sexual exploitation,
abuse, or assault of women and girls. The Julie Doe II court concluded that the Jane
Doe v. MySpace case was “exactly on point” and similarly ruled that the CDA
provided immunity to the web-based service provider. Julie Doe II, at 573, fn. 6. In
the Jane Doe v. MySpace case, the Fifth Circuit also addressed actual knowledge of
the alleged tortious conduct and held that the immunity provision of the CDA still
applied. “Thus like strict liability, liability upon notice has a chilling effect on the
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freedom of Internet speech. . . Because the probable effects of distributor liability on
the vigor of Internet speech and on service provider self-regulations are directly
contrary to §230’s statutory purposes, we will not assume that Congress intended to
leave liability upon notice intact.” Jane Doe v. MySpace, supra, at 419 (quoting
Zeran, supra, at 333.)
The Julie Doe II court also relied upon the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in Zeran, supra, quoting:
Congress’ purpose in providing the §230 immunity was thus evident.
Interactive computer services have millions of users. The amount of
information communicated via interactive computer services is
therefore staggering. The specter of tort liability in an area of such
prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be
impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of
postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for each
message republished by their services, interactive computer service
providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of
messages posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech
interests implicated and chose to immunize service providers to avoid
any such restrictive effect.
Id. at 567. (quoting Zeran, at 331). Finally, authority is also well-settled that a
web-based service provider need not adopt safety measures in order to receive the
protection afforded by the CDA. Julie Doe II, at 572-73 (“That appellants
characterize their complaint as one for failure to adopt reasonable safety measures
does not avoid the immunity granted by section 230”).
In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations are identical to those pleaded in the Julie
Doe II and Jane Doe v. MySpace cases. She alleges she was contacted through the
Website and was “lured” to South Florida by her assailants. Her harm occurred off-
line as a result of tortious conduct by two individuals un-affiliated with Internet
Brands. As in the other cases cited by the Julie Doe II court, the allegations do not
give rise to a cause of action against the web-based service provider. Internet
Brands did not owe Plaintiff a duty to warn and is protect by the immunity provided
by the CDA. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief and the
requested dismissal is appropriate.






























DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Lastly, Plaintiff does not even plead that the Internet Brands’ alleged failure
to perform in accordance with any legally recognized duty was the cause of her
injuries. As with the Julie Doe II and Jane Doe v. MySpace cases, the injury
occurred off-line, which means the web-based service provider was not the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Julie Doe II, at 574. Here, Plaintiff
pleaded that her injuries were caused by unrelated third parties, not Internet Brands.
As such, and consistent with authority on this point, she cannot state a claim for




The law is well-settled and unanimous; the CDA provides immunity to web-
based service providers for common law torts committed by website users. Persons
injured or otherwise damaged by third party tortfeasors are not without remedy, and
may hold directly liable the person(s) causing the harm. Plaintiff may file a claim
against the alleged third party tortfeasors, but her claim against Internet Brands runs










































DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
WHEREFORE, Internet Brands, prays as follows:
1. That judgment be entered in favor of Internet Brands, Inc., that the
Complaint and any claims therein against Internet Brands be dismissed
with prejudice and that Plaintiff take nothing by way of her Complaint;
2. For attorneys’ fees;
3. For costs of suit incurred herein; and
4. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
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